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1.  Introduction 
During the last decade, the lack of precise scientific measures of future environmental and 
agricultural risks has often induced many economists to investigate people’s perceptions of those 
risks. The study of risk perceptions becomes even more important when it is apparent that people 
behave and make decisions according to what they believe risks to be, and when these beliefs 
might not coincide with science-based estimates of risk. 
Since the main critique about the use of these subjective estimates in economic analyses is 
about their reliability, we aim to test the validity of subjective estimates of risks elicited via an 
innovative risk elicitation technique, the exchangeability method (EM). In particular, we focus 
on  consumers’  perceptions  of  the  probability  that  given  levels  of  pesticide  residues  will  be 
present in apples produced in the future. These residues pose a health risk to people who eat the 
apples, and, thus, their presence on apples can affect economic behaviours of consumers.  
Although the EM has many advantages compared to other risk elicitation techniques, many 
doubts have been raised about its incentive compatibility. In fact, the chained structure of its 
experimental  design  is  accused  of  undermining  the  incentive  compatibility  of  the  process, 
especially  when  respondents  are  provided  with  real  monetary  incentives  (Harrison,  1986). 
Previous  studies  have  overcome  this  issue  by  presenting  people  with  peculiar  experimental 
designs that partially hide the chained structure of the game (Baillon, 2008; Abdellaoui et al., 
2010) but, to our knowledge, no study has ever tested Harrison’s hypothesis.  
Our lab experiment aims to define a clear-cut valuation method for measuring the validity 
of subjective risk estimates elicited via the EM. This valuation method based on de Finetti’s 
notion of “coherence” examines the “validity rates” of subjective risk estimates, which is the 
number of valid risk measures obtained from each specific experimental design we use during 
the experiment. Through this method we also aim to exam the potential effect of real monetary 
incentives and chained questions on subjective risk estimates elicited via EM. In particular, we 
study whether these factors affect the validity of elicited subjective risks or not
1. 
 
2.  The Exchangeability game 
Considering a random variable under study, for instance g, the EM uses a series of binary 
questions to reveal an individual’s underlying cumulative distribution function (CDF) over an 
event x that is drawn from an event space, SG =
1
1 G . The first step of the EM establishes the lower 
and  upper  bounds  of  the  event  space,  say  g0  and  g1.  Each  subject  is  asked  the  bounds  on 
outcomes outside of which they are essentially certain the outcome cannot happen at all ― i.e., 
the bounds that pertain to a non-zero probability of an outcome.  
The second step involves asking a series of questions that establish the value of g1/2ÎSG 
that corresponds with the 50
th percentile of the subjective CDF, the median estimate. This series 
of questions asks the subject to choose between binary prospects. In the first binary question, SG 
is divided at a point ga into two prospects, say Ga={g0<x£ga} and Ga’={ga<x<g1}, where ga={g0 
+  [(g1-g0)/2]}  (see  Example  1  in  Appendix  A).  If  Ga  was  chosen  by  the  individual,  the 
implication is that the individual believes P(Ga)³P(Ga’), so that ga³g1/2. A follow-up binary 
question is then asked of this same individual, using a new value gb and two new prospects Gb 
and Gb’.  If Ga was chosen in the first question, then ga<gb. However, if Ga’ was chosen in the 
                                                 
1 Only expected results are presented in this version of the manuscript because the experiment will be run in the first 
week of February at the Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory (CEEL) of the University of Trento 
(Italy). Here, we present the theoretical framework and the testable hypotheses we use to test the validity of the EM. 
However, these theoretical hypotheses will be empirically tested using data coming from the experiment.    3
first question, then gb>ga. This process is repeated until the individual reaches a value gz such 
that she is indifferent between Gz and Gz’. When this point is reached, it follows that gz=g1/2, 
Gz=
1
2 G , Gz’=
2
2 G , and P(Gz)=P(Gz’). 
A similar process can be followed to determine other points for the individual’s subjective 
CDF; in theory as many as the researcher wants, but of course limited by exhaustion of the 
subject. For instance, to determine the value of g1/4ÎSG that corresponds with the 25
th percentile, 
a gamble is proposed that is contingent on a value of x that is lower than g1/2, obtained in the 
previous step. Once again, a sequence of values, ga, gb, …, gz is used, but in this case the initial 
upper bound is g1/2. In the first new binary question, subjects choose between the following 
binary prospects, Ga={g0<x£gA} and  Ga’={k1<x<g1/2}. As above, this process is repeated until 
the  individual  is  indifferent  between  Gz  and  Gz’,  so  that  gz=g1/4  Gz=
1
4 G ,  Gz’=
2
4 G ,  and 
P(Gz)=P(Gz’) (Figure 1). 
 
3.  Strengths and limitations of Exchangeability Method 
The reliability of many risk elicitation techniques has been tested in the literature reporting 
on laboratory experiment results, especially concerning financial risks, but, to some extent for 
health and environmental risks. Defining the risk as a probability that given outcomes occur (or 
that  given  magnitudes  of  an  outcome  occur),  these  techniques  are  used  to  obtain  subjective 
probability estimates of the occurrence of those outcomes (or magnitudes). Many investigations 
have elicited risks through “direct methods”, that is by asking people to directly state either the 
chance that a specific magnitude of the outcome will happen in the future or, the other way 
round,  the  specific  magnitude  of  the  outcome  that  will  happen  with  a  certain  probability 
(Spetzler and Von Holstein, 1975). Although this approach is very much straightforward, many 
doubts have been raised about the reliability of risk estimates because of the unfamiliarity of 
laypeople with the notion of probability (e.g., Jakus et al., 2009; Riddel and Shaw, 2006 for 
health risks; and Baker et al., 2009; Botzen et al., 2009 for environmental risks).  
More sophisticated methodologies, eliciting risk measures via respondents’ choices over 
lotteries and bets, have been implemented to overcome limitations of “direct methods”. In this 
case,  probability  measures  are  indirectly  estimated  at  the  point  in  which  people  show 
indifference between lotteries or gambles. Even if these techniques, called “indirect”, have been 
mostly used for financial risks (e.g., Andersen et al., 2009; Offerman et al., 2009), nowadays 
scholars start considering them for estimating health and environmental risks (e.g., see Fiore et 
al., 2009; Cerroni and Shaw, 2011 for environmental risks)
2.  
The most popular “indirect methods” are the so-called “external reference events” in which 
people are asked to bet on, either a lottery characterized by an uncertain event whose probability 
needs to be estimated, or a lottery characterized by an external reference event whose probability 
is  known.  The  probability  related  to  the  latter  lottery  is  often  visually  presented  through 
probability wheels or scroll bars. During experiments using these methods, people are asked to 
express  their  preferences  for  one  of  the  two  lotteries,  and, when respondents are  indifferent 
between them, this means that they attach to the uncertain outcome the same probability with 
which the familiar outcome will happen (Spetzler and Von Holstein, 1975). Although, these 
techniques  are  widely  used,  they  have  a  crucial  drawback  related  to  the  notion  of  “source 
                                                 
2 The limited use of “indirect methods” for eliciting health and environmental risks is only due to the fact that health 
outcomes and very long term environmental outcomes cannot be played out at the end of experiments in the lab 
setting.   4
dependence”. Some experimental studies have recently shown that individual choices depend on 
the  source  of  uncertainty
3  respondent  have  been  told  to  consider  (Kilka  and  Weber,  2001; 
Abdellaoui et al, 2010). When individuals have to process more than one source of uncertainty at 
the same time, their risk estimates might be biased because of source dependence. This is likely 
to  occur  in  “external  reference  events”  approaches  in  which  subjects  have  to  deal  with 
uncertainties related to both outcomes and probabilities represented through external devices. 
“Source  dependence”  does  not  appear  in  another  class  of  “indirect  methods”,  called 
“internal  events”,  in  which  people  deal  with  magnitudes  of  the  outcome,  but  not  with 
probabilities that are not even mentioned to them. In fact, respondents are only asked to bet on 
disjoint subspaces of the whole state space of the variable under study. When they are indifferent 
between the two subspaces, then they are assumed to perceive them as equally likely (Spetzler 
and  Von  Holstein,  1975).  The  EM,  formally  described  by  Raiffa  (1968)  and  recently 
implemented by Baillon (2008) and Abdellaoui et al. (2010), is based on this idea.  
Although  this  technique  bypasses  the  problem  of  “source  dependence”,  it  has  a  much 
disputed  technical  drawback  related  to  its  incentive  compatibility.  Its  peculiar  experimental 
design, based on chained questions, is accused to undermine the incentive compatibility of the 
game, in particular when respondents are provided with real monetary incentives. In particular 
the EM’s experimental design is characterized by a set of binary questions in which the two 
disjoint  subspaces  characterizing  each  question  depend  on  which  subspace  each  respondent 
decided  to  bet  on  in  the  previous  question.  Given  this  design,  respondents  may  behave 
strategically and prefer not answering in line with their real preferences to get new stimuli from 
the following questions (Harrison, 1986). 
To our knowledge, previous investigations, using games with chained structures and real 
monetary  incentives,  have  taken  this  issue  very  seriously.  For  instance,  some  of  them  have 
validated their results by using respondents’ statements of unawareness about the presence of 
chained questions in the game (Van de Kuilen et al., 1981 and Abdellaoui et al., 2010). In his 
application of exchangeability method, Baillon (2008) dealt with this problem by randomizing 
the order of questions and making the chaining unclear to respondents, in the sense that they are 
not longer aware of the relation between the disjoint subspaces they face in one question with 
those of the previous question.   
It  is  clear  that all  previous  studies,  using  chained  games in  presence  of  real  monetary 
incentives, have struck at the root of the problem by avoiding the use of identifiable chained 
questions  in  their  experimental  designs  without  even  thinking  to  investigate  their  presumed 
negative effect on people’s choice-behaviours. Hence, our study aims to test the presence of a 
potential “chaining effect” by comparing the validity rate of subjective risk estimates elicited via 
exchangeability games where the chained structure of the experimental design is hidden or not to 
respondents. 
A very interesting point about the incentive compatibility of exchangeability method have 
been made by Baillon (2008), who claimed that telling the truth is the simplest and efficient 
strategy respondents can use when they play the game. A direct consequence of this reasoning is 
that  respondents  may  not  care  about  real  monetary  incentives  because  the  game  may  be 
considered incentive compatible by itself. At this regard, in their application of exchangeability 
game, Abdellaoui et al. (2010) have tested the effect of real monetary incentives on people’s 
                                                 
3 Taking inspiration from Heath and Tversky (1991), Baillon (2008) defined a source of uncertainty as “…a set of 
events that are generated by a common mechanism of uncertainty”.  
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choice-behaviours  by  comparing  subjective  risk  estimates  provided  by  two  groups  of 
respondents, one provided with monetary incentives and the other not. They conclude that the 
former  group  provides  less  noisy  risk  estimates  than  the  latter  group,  however,  the  figures 
showing the risk estimates do not in fact illustrate much difference. In addition, given that this 
analysis  uses  a  between–subjects  investigation,  this  discrepancy  of  results  may  be  due  to 
different  compositions  of  samples.  Moreover,  the  assumption  under  which  rewarded  people 
provide more reliable estimates of the other is only a speculation, in fact the opposite may be 
true.  
Below,  we  define  a  clear-cut  valuation  method  to  test  the  presumed  superiority  of 
subjective risk estimates elicited via exchangeability game when people are rewarded with real 
monetary  incentives  and  when  they  are  presented  with  unchained  questions.  Our  valuation 
method is based on the comparison among “validity rates” of subjective risk estimates obtained 
by using various versions of exchangeability game. 
 
4.  The notion of validity rate 
The “validity rate” is defined as the number of valid subjective risk estimates provided by 
people, while a valid risk measure is the one that de Finetti defines as “coherent”, in the sense 
that it obeys to all axioms and theorems of probability theory (de Finetti, 1937, 1974)
4. The 
choice  of  using  the  de  Finetti’s  notion  of  “coherence”  to  define  valid  risk  measures  is  not 
groundless, but relies on the fact that “exchangeability method” is based on the assumption of 
“exchangeability-based probabilistic sophistication” (Chew and Sagi, 2006), that in turn is based 
on the notion of  “exchangeability events” (de Finetti, 1937). 
The  idea  of  “Probabilistic  sophistication”  as  originally  formulated  by  Machina  and 
Schmeidler (1992) implies that decision makers’ choices depend upon their probabilistic beliefs. 
Assuming a lottery L = (E1:x1,…, En:xn) where a decision maker achieves the monetary outcome 
xi  only  if  the  event  Ei  happens,  she/he  is  “probabilistically  sophisticated”  when  her/his 
preferences  over  lotteries  are  only  determined  by  the  subjective  probabilities  of  occurrence 
she/he attaches to each event Ei. This notion of probabilistic sophistication relies on axioms of 
Savage’s subjective utility theory (SEU).  Chew and Sagi (2006) provide a much more intuitive 
notion of probabilistic sophistication based on the idea of “exchangeable events” by de Finetti 
(1937). Exchangeability, as formulated by de Finetti, implies that the probability that each event 
belonging to the set, occurs is the same without depending on the order of the events, but only on 
the number n of events. Hence, even the joint probability of all events belonging to a set of n 
events is always the same and does not depend on the order of the events (de Finetti, 1937).  
Based on de Finetti’s idea of equal likelihoods of exchangeable events, Chew and Sagi 
defined two events as “comparable”, under a probabilistic point of view, only when a sub-event 
of  one  is  exchangeable  with  the  other  event.  This  way  of  comparison  is  intuitively 
straightforward considering that a sub-event is logically less likely than the event in which it is 
contained. It is clear that, under “exchangeability-based probabilistic sophistication”, the choice-
behaviour of the decision maker is based on probabilistic beliefs deriving from the notion of 
exchangeable  events.  In  conclusion,  for  a  probabilistically  sophisticated  respondent  playing 
exchangeability game, two disjoint sub-events are “exchangeable”, and thus they have the same 
                                                 
4 de Finetti’s (1937, 1974) definition of “coherence” is related to the notion of probability. We extend his definition 
to the notion of risk because we define risk as the probability that a given event (or a given magnitude of an event) 
occurs.   6
probability of occurrence, when she/he is indifferent in betting on one sub-event rather than on 
the other one.  
Given this theoretical background, it is clear that “exchangeability” assumption enforces 
that probability estimates elicited via the EM are valid measures. In fact, all definitions, axioms 
and  theorems  of probability theory  are  satisfied  under  the  assumption  of    “exchangeability” 
implying that probabilities of each disjoint event 
i
j G  are equal (see Appendix A). Therefore, we 
aim  to  test  the  validity  of  subjective  risk  estimates  elicited  via  exchangeability  method  by 
investigating whether respondents’ choice behaviours are consistent with the “exchangeability” 
assumption or not. 
 
5.  Hypotheses 
We  study  the  validity  of  subjective  risk  estimates  by  testing  whether  subjects’  choice 
behaviours satisfy “exchangeability” assumption or not. In particular, considering two disjoint 
sub-events are exchangeable when the probability related to the occurrence of one is equal to the 
probability of occurrence of the other. 
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Specific tests for exchangeability will be presented in Section 7.1. 
After having investigated the validity of risk estimates elicited via exchangeability method, 
we test whether diverse experimental settings affect the “validity rate” (V) of subjective risk 
measures.  We remind that the “validity rate” is the number of subjective risk measures that 
satisfy  the  “exchangeability  assumption”  and,  thus,  all  axioms  and  theorems  of  probability 
theory. In particular we test the following hypotheses: 
a.  The provision of real monetary incentives to respondents does not affect the “validity rate”, 
that is the number of valid risk measures. In this case, the “validity rate” of subjective estimates 
of risk is equal when respondents are provided with real monetary incentives (Vm) and when they 
are not (Vh). 
H0: Vm = Vh 
H1: Vm ≠ Vh 
b. The awareness of the chaining structure of the exchangeability game does not influence the 
“validity rate”, that is the number of valid risk measures. In this case, the “validity rate” of 
subjective estimates of risk is equal when respondents are aware of the chaining structure of the 
game (Vc) and when they are not (Vu). 
H0: Vc = Vu 
H1: Vc ≠ Vu 
c.  The  provision  of  real  monetary  incentives  to  respondents  who  are  aware  of  the  chained 
structure  of  the  game  does  not  affect  the  “validity  rate”,  that  is  the  number  of  valid  risk 
measures. In this case, the “validity rate” of subjective estimates of risk when respondents are 
provided with real monetary incentives and when respondents are not aware of chaining structure 
of the game (Vmu) is equal to the validity rate when respondents are provided with real monetary 
incentives, but they are aware of chaining structure of the game (Vmc). 
H0: Vmc = Vmu 
H1: Vmc ≠ Vmu 
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6.  The specific application and experiment.  
This study covers the investigation of subjective risks related to fire blight, a bacterial 
disease threatening apple orchards in the Province of Trento since 2005 (IASMA, 2006). This 
phytopathology damages and kills apple plants provoking losses in the production of apples, one 
the most important agricultural products of this Italian province. Scientists at the Edmund Mach 
Foundation predicts a future spread of the disease in many apple orchards of the Province of 
Trento because suitable climatic conditions for the biology of the bacterium Erwinia amylovora 
are likely to occur in future.  
Italian  farmers  currently  control  Fire  Blight  and  its  negative  consequences  on  apple 
production by only using a small number of not much toxic pesticides. Given that these measures 
might be not efficient enough to prevent the future spread of fire blight, farmers are expected to 
start  implementing  new  adaptation  strategies  against  fire  blight.  The  only  strategy  that  is 
currently available to farmers is the introduction of new active principles for control of fire blight 
such as the antibiotic streptomycin that is currently forbidden by the Italian legislation, but that 
has been already used in U.S., and other European countries for controlling fire light (personal 
communication from Edmund Mach Foundation). 
In the context presented above, we decided to investigate three diverse random variables: 
the percentage (or number) of days in which the infestation will occur during the blossoming 
period in 2030 (g), the number of apples containing residues in a sample of 100 apples in 2030 
(a), and the number of apples containing more than one residue in a sample of 100 apples in 
2030 (r). These variables have been selected after having interviewed approximately 20 focus 
group subjects.  
The sample of laboratory subjects consists of 100 individuals who were randomly recruited 
outside the main supermarkets of Trento and asked to come in the experimental laboratory of the 
University  of  Trento  under  a  compensation  of  25€  (show-up  fee).  Selected  participants  are 
divided  in  four  subsamples  that  we  call  treatments,  each  is  characterized  by  a  different 
experimental  design:  “real  incentives-unchaining”,  “real  incentives-chaining”,  “hypothetical 
incentives-unchaining”, and “hypothetical incentives-chaining”.  
In  the  “hypothetical  incentives”  treatments,  respondents  are  not  provided  with  real 
monetary incentives in addition to the show-up fee, while, in the “real incentives” ones, they are 
told that one randomly selected individual from each group  has the chance to win additional 
100€ based on her/his choices during the experiment. In particular they are informed that one 
respondent in each treatment will be randomly selected at the end of the experiment as well as 
one of the questions she/he will answer during the experiment. The participant, who might win 
the additional 100€, will be selected through the draw of a numbered chip from a cage that 
contains as many numbered chips as the number of computer positions that are in the laboratory. 
Each numbered chips is related to a numbered computer position. The question, that might make 
the drawn respondents earning, will be selected through the draw of a numbered chip from a 
cage  that  contains as  many  numbered  chips  as  the  number  of questions  that  the  respondent 
answer during the experiment. Each numbered chips is related to a numbered question. The 
drawn participant win the additional 100€ if and only if the event she/he had chosen in the drawn 
question is consistent with the simulation about the random variable under study provided by the 
Edmund Mach Foundation. 
In the  “chained” treatments, respondents play the exchangeability  game facing  chained 
questions where the outcomes presented in one questions clearly depend on their choice in the 
previous one. In particular, we ask them to answer questions that allow us to elicit the percentiles   8
of their  CDFs  in  the  following  order:  g1/2, g1/4,  g3/4,  a1/2,  a1/4,  a3/4,  r1/2,  r1/4,  and  r3/4. In  the 
“unchained”  treatments,  this  chained  structure  of  the  game  is  hidden  through  a  particular 
randomization  of  questions.  In  fact,  we  elicit  the  percentiles  of  respondents’’  CDFs  in  the 
following order: g1/2, a1/2, r1/2, g1/4, a1/4, r1/4, g3/4,  a3/4,and  r3/4. 
Analyzing  three  different  random  variables,  it  follows  that  each  respondent,  whatever 
treatment she/he belongs to, plays exchangeability games and lotteries three times, one for each 
random variable under study.  
 
7.  Methodology  
The assessment of the validity rate of subjective risk estimates for each treatment of our 
experiment represents the first step to take for investigating the presence of “chaining effect” and 
“real incentive effect”. The validity rate is the number of valid subjective estimates provided by 
respondents, which is the number of individual estimates satisfying exchangeability. Since the 
exchangeability  is  a  crucial  requirement  for  identifying  valid  subjective  risk  estimates,  we 
implement three diverse tests to investigate whether respondents’ behaviours are consistent with 
this notion. While one of them, say Test 3, only investigates whether exchangeability is satisfied 
for each respondent’s risk estimate within the sample, the others, say Test 1 and Test 2, also 
checks whether exchangeability is globally satisfied in the whole sample.  
Then,  we  test  the  presence  of  “chaining  effect”  and  “real  incentive  effect”  by  using 
different techniques. First, we compare validity rate of subjective risk estimates obtained for 
each particular experimental setting characterizing each treatment. Validity rates are assumed to 
be proxies of the goodness of the used experimental setting. Second, we econometrically test 
“chaining  effect”  and  “real  incentive  effect”  by  estimating  a  model  in  which  the  discrete 
dependent  variable  captures  the  validity  of  subjective  risk  estimates  and  these  effects  are 
captured by dummy variables representing the characteristics of each experimental setting. The 
estimation of this model takes into consideration the panel nature of our dataset.  
7.1 Exchangeability tests 
The first test (Test 1) is implemented by eliciting a new measure of the median value of 
individual CDFs, say g1/2’, through a second round of exchangeability game. This round differs 
from the first one because the lower and upper bounds of the event space are not anymore g0 and 
g1, but the subjective estimates of the quartiles g1/4 and g3/4 elicited via the first round of EM. 
This  investigation  tests  whether  the  assumption  of  exchangeability  is  satisfied  or  not  by 
comparing  the  subjective  estimates  of  g1/2  and  g1/2’.  In  particular,  if  they  are  equal,  then 
exchangeability is satisfied, otherwise not:  
H0: g1/2  = g1/2’ 
H1: g1/2 ≠ g1/2’ 
We test this hypothesis both at sample level and at individual level. In the first case, we use 
nonparametric tests such as Mann-Whitney U (MWU) and Kolmogorv-Smirnov (KS) tests, in 
the second case, we simply check if g1/2’= g1/2. 
 The second test (Test 2) is based on the notion of “certainty equivalent” (CE) defined as 
the sure amount of money that makes people indifferent to gamble. Respondents are presented 
with  choice  tasks  where  they  are  asked  to  choose  between  a  lottery,  in  which  they  win  a 
monetary  outcome  x  if  the  real  outcome 
i
j G   will  happen  in  the  future  (or  a  null  monetary 
outcome  otherwise),  and  a  sure  payment  z.  According  to  “exchangeability”  assumption,  the 
certainty equivalent respondents are willing to accept in order to giving up the possibility to play 
these  lotteries  should  be  equal  for  those  characterized  by  real  outcomes 
i
j G   that  have  been   9
judged to be equally likely by respondents themselves during the first round of EM. For this 
reason, this test of exchangeability checks the following hypotheses: 
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We  test  this  hypothesis  both  at  sample  level  by  using  Mann-Whitney  U  (MWU)  and 
Kolmogorv-Smirnov  (KS)  tests,  and  at  individual  level  by  checking  if 




j G x L CE G x L CE : : = . 
 The  third  test  (Test  3)  is  based  on  the  creation  of  a  multiple  choice  card  where 
respondents, for each choice task, have the possibility to choose between lotteries that they have 
implicitly defined to be equivalent according to their choices during the first round of EM. A 
crucial point is that respondents have also the possibility to show their indifference among these 
lotteries by choosing neither. In each choice task, respondents are presented with two lotteries, 
both characterized by a monetary outcome x and by a real outcome
i
j G . Respondents gain the 
same monetary outcome x if the real outcome 
i
j G  of the lottery they have chosen will happen in 
the future or a null monetary outcome otherwise. Under the assumption of “exchangeability”, 
respondents  are  assumed  to  be  indifferent  between  lotteries  characterized  by  real  outcomes 
which have been defined as equally likely by respondents themselves during the first round of 
exchangeability game. In fact those lotteries are equivalent, in the sense that they exactly provide 
the same payoff. Hence, exchangeability holds if and only if respondents decide to bet on neither 
confirming their indifference between the two prospects they have shown in the first round of 
EM. In particular, we test the following hypotheses: 
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This  hypothesis  can  be  tested  only  at  individual  level  by  simply  checking 




j G x L G x L : : » . 
7.2 Chaining effect and real monetary incentive effect 
The hypotheses related to “chaining” and “real incentive” effects are tested by using two 
diverse  approaches;  while  the first  is  very  much  based  on  intuition,  the second  is  based  on 
econometric analyses. 
In the first approach, we simply calculate the validity rate of subjective risk estimates that is 
the number of valid risk measures elicited via exchangeability method for each treatment of the 
experiment. We assume that subjective risk estimates are valid if and only if the following null 
hypotheses are not rejected: 
a.  H0: g1/2  = g1/2’ at sample and individual levels 




j G x L CE G x L CE : : = , with k ≠ i, k ≤ j at sample and individual levels 




j G x L G x L : : » , with k ≠ i, k ≤ j at individual level 
The treatment obtaining the highest validity rate represents the most efficient experimental 
design that can be used to elicit subjective risk estimates via exchangeability method, and its 
characterization in terms of chained/unchained structure and real/hypothetical incentives allows 
us to investigate the presence of “chaining” and “real incentive” effects.  
In particular, if the “real incentives-unchaining” treatment obtains the highest validity rate, 
we  can  conclude  that,  as  the  literature  in  economic  experiments  predicts,  real  monetary   10
incentives increases the reliability of risk estimates. Moreover, as predicted by Harrison (1986), 
chained structures of experimental games create problems for risk elicitation, especially if these 
structures are combined with a system of incentives based on real payments. 
Assuming that the highest validity rate is obtained by “real incentives-chaining” treatment, 
we  can  conclude  that,  real  monetary  incentives  improves  reliability  of  results,  and  their 
combination with chained structures does not have the presumed negative effect predicted by 
Harrison (1986).  
The hypothesis under which real incentives increase the reliability of obtained risk estimates 
is  rejected  if  “hypothetical  incentives-unchaining”  and  “hypothetical  incentives-chaining” 
treatments obtain the highest validity score. Moreover, we might claim that EM is incentive 
compatible by itself, and that real incentives have a misleading effect on respondents. However, 
in case “unchaining” treatment gets the highest validity rate, we deduce that the chained structure 
of games negatively affects the validity of results as predicted by the literature in economic 
experiments, while, in the other case, we argue that chained structure of EM helps respondents to 
provide better risk estimates.  
In the second approach, we build a model in which the discrete dependent variable, which 
describes if subjective risk estimates are valid or not, is explained by a set of dependent variables 
taking  into  account  socio-economic  characteristics  of  respondents,  their  attitude  towards  the 
consumption  of  apples  and  food  contamination,  and,  the  treatment  they  belong  to.  The  last 
information  is  captured  by  a  set  of  dummy  variables  in  the  sense  that  each  treatment  is 
represented  by  a  dummy  variable  which  takes  value  one  if  the  respondent  belong  to  this 
treatment and value zero otherwise. 
We  estimate  this  model  taking  into  account  both  the  discrete  nature  of  the  dependent 
variable under study and the panel nature of our data set (random and fixed effects logit models). 
In fact, each respondent provides us three different estimates, g1/4, g1/2, and g3/4, that are basically 
provided in three different times.  
The  statistical  significance  and  the  signs  obtained  by  coefficients  of  dummy  variables 
interest  our  analysis,  because  they  allow  us  to  understand  which  characteristics  of  the 
experimental design affect the probability that subjective risk estimates are valid or not. The 
interpretation of results is very much similar to that described for the first approach presented in 
this paragraph.  
 
8.  Expected results 
We aim to define a clear-cut valuation method to investigate the validity of subjective risk 
measures elicited via exchangeability method. This method allows us to investigate whether real 
monetary incentives and chained questions affect the validity of risk estimates. 
To our knowledge, previous investigations using EM have been always conducted by using 
real monetary incentives as suggested by the literature in experimental economics. Nevertheless, 
taking inspiration from a Baillon’s sentence (2008), we hypothesize that real monetary incentives 
do not really matter in EM because the simplest strategy respondents can use to play the game is 
telling the truth.   
If  this  is  the  case,  the  presumed  negative  effect  of  the  chained  structure  of  EM’s 
experimental  design  hypothesized  by  Harrison  (1986)  should  almost  disappear  because  it  is 
mostly due to strategic behaviours of incentivized respondents. On the contrary, we hypothesize 
that a negative effect of chained questions still exists because the chained structure of EM induce 
respondents to answer meaningless questions. In fact, the implementation of an experimental   11
design  in  which  the  chained  structure  is  not  hidden  by  a  randomization  of  questions  lead 
respondents to face binary questions describing two prospects that they have already ruled out in 
previous questions.  
In conclusion, we hypothesize that the highest “validity rate” might be reached in the groups 
of people who faces “unchained” experimental designs. Moreover, given that telling the truth 
seems to be the respondents’ easiest way of playing the game, we expect that real monetary 
incentives do not have any effect on the reliability of estimates. In conclusion, we predict that 
“real  monetary  incentives-unchained  questions”  and  “hypothetical  monetary  incentives-
unchained questions” will obtain the highest “validity rates”. 
 
9.  Conclusion 
In the last few years, scholars investigating environmental and health risk perceptions have 
started looking at “indirect methods” of risk elicitation. The most used techniques relying on the 
use  of  “external  reference  events”,  but  recent  works  on  risk  elicitation  have  re-discovered 
methodologies based on “internal events”, an example is the Exchangeability Method (EM). 
Although this technique seems to overcome some limitations of “external reference events”-
based techniques, it suffers from other limitations. In this paper we focus on very technical and 
methodological issues related to the EM by using the very intriguing statistical findings by the 
Italian mathematician Bruno de Finetti. In particular we investigate the effect of real monetary 
incentives and chained experimental designs on the validity of subjective risk estimates elicited 
via EM. We expect to obtain empirical data from our lab experiment suggesting that, while real 
incentives do not play any role since the simplest strategy respondents can use to play the game 
is telling the truth (Baillon, 2008), chained questions might have a negative effect on the validity 
of risk estimates. This work is one of the few attempts to investigate peoples’ perceptions of 
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Appendix A. Definition, axioms and theorems of probability theory 
Let 
i
j G  be disjoint events with i = {1,..,n}and j = n and SG be a sample space, then:  
Statement 1.  ( ) 0 ³
i
j G P              
Statement 2.  ( ) 1 = G S P                               
Statement 3. If { }
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Statement 5.  ( ) 0 = f P  
Statement 6. For each  , G
i
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Figure 1: Structure of the experimental design 
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